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Abstract 
The first impetus to Zimbabwe’s drive to hyperinflation and official dollarization predates the disruption in 
production caused by the fast-track land reform programme.  The initial push came from the departure from 
relatively disciplined fiscal policies to a string of measures aimed at pacifying restive groups threatening political 
power through the transfer of economic and financial resources to those groups to the detriment of the fiscus.  This 
stance caused investors to run away from the Zimbabwean currency thus causing currency depreciation hence 
inducing cost-push inflation which was worsened by the decline in production that accompanied the land reform 
programme and the associated disturbances to production in all sectors of the economy.  The liquidity expansion 
by the central bank to prop the ruling party embodied in the quasi-fiscal activities veiled as expansionary Keynesian 
economics played a major role in firmly setting the stage for hyperinflation in the latter stages of the saga.  In the 
backdrop of hyperinflation, the institution of official dollarization was merely de jure recognition of the unofficial 
dollarization that had set in.  On the basis of Zimbabwe’s idiosyncrasies, the article contends that any attempt to 
dedollarize should be an endogenous outcome of a policy of macroeconomic stabilization.  
Keywords: Africa, Zimbabwe, Hyperinflation, Currency problems 
JEL classification codes: E31, E42, E58, E61, O55 
GRIPS Policy Information Center Discussion Paper:09-12
1
1. Introduction 
Zimbabwe acquired relative prominence in mainstream media in the late 90s, predominantly 
due to the country’s economic and financial dislocation (characterized by hyperinflation at its worst) 
which culminated in the adoption of official dollarization in 2008.  These events came in the 
backdrop of the fast-track land reform programme, which entailed the expropriation of white-owned 
commercial farms for redistribution to the landless black majority. Though there is a direct nexus 
between the two processes, the former cannot be exclusively ascribed to the latter; there are a host of 
other issues that have contributed to the economic and financial breakdown in Zimbabwe. 
The economic and financial breakdown has been explosive as it has been socially harmful.  
Table 1 below shows the time series evolution of some of the relevant macroeconomic indicators 
from 1998 to 2007. 
Table 1: Macroeconomic trends 1998 - 2007 
Year GDP growth rate (%) Annual Inflation (%) M1 change (%) 
1998 -0.8 47 26 
1999 -2.1 57 39 
2000 -7 55 53 
2001 -3 112 144 
2002 -4 199 171 
2003 -10 599 491 
2004 -2 133 234 
2005 -4 586 547 
2006 -3 1281 1315 
2007 -6 7982 66659 
Source: RBZ (2009) 
From table 1 above, inflation increased from 47 percent in 1998 to qualify the Cagan’s (1956) 
hyperinflation definition when it reached of 7,982 percent in 2007, thereon it kept increasing to reach 
231,150,889 percent in July 2008 whereupon the country disbanded the national currency and 
adopted a basket of foreign currencies as legal tender five months later.  In some instances inflation 
was fuelled by huge money expansion that was running at the rate of 66,659 percent annually in 2007.  
The fall in production and the depreciation of the exchange rate have both been cause as well as 
consequent to inflation in different instances of the progression of the series.   
 Though the basic facts surrounding Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation have enjoyed widespread 
exposure in the media, there is a general paucity of academic literature on the fundamental constructs 
that underlie the phenomenon in Zimbabwe.  Coorey et al (2007) single out excessive money 
expansion stemming from the central bank’s quasi-fiscal activities as the culprit in Zimbabwe’s 
hyperinflation.  These findings are corroborated by Makochekanwa (2007) who modeled 
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Zimbabwe’s money demand using an Error Correction Model and concluded Zimbabwe’s 
hyperinflation has been dependent on excessive liquidity.  Whilst these studies have been insightful 
with regards to the actual mechanics of Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation, they eschew rigorous analysis of 
the historical and political factors that gave rise to those mechanics.  This study attempts to bridge that 
gap by answering two specific questions; firstly what factors, political and economic, led to the 
financial collapse in Zimbabwe?  And secondly, given the official dollarization in the aftermath of 
hyperinflation, what framework could be followed to reintroduce a national currency should the 
country seek to dedollarize?  It is imperative to note that in the second undertaking, this paper does 
not seek to evaluate the merits or lack thereof, of a dedollarization agenda; rather it seeks an answer 
to an abstract question pertaining to the optimal dedollarization path for Zimbabwe given its 
idiosyncrasies.  Whilst this approach might a priori seem presumptuous, it finds basis in the 
prevailing climate of opinion, misguided or otherwise, within the country’s political establishment 
that is skewed towards eventual reintroduction of a national currency.  
 In this endeavor, the paper fuses vignettes of the Zimbabwean experience with analytical 
narratives based on economic theory.  It provides a political-economic analysis of Zimbabwe's history 
that exposes the ties between financial and political phenomena.  In terms of the policy question, the 
paper seeks to give an evaluative worth of the three options open to the Zimbabwean government for 
dedollarization and recommends on the basis of a trajectory of what can obtain in the event of the 
adoption of any of the options. The major findings of the study are that the road to financial collapse 
has been littered with dirigisme, populist policies and huge money expansion.  The study also 
observed on the basis of the perceived realizations of the possible dedollarization frameworks, that 
the path for Zimbabwe dedollarization should spurn dirigisme of administrative enforcement or 
regulatory measures. 
The arrangement of the rest of this paper is as follows; section two is broken down into four 
subsections according to significant political and economic turning points in the country’s history, 
chronicling the route to hyperinflation and official dollarization.  Section three explores the several 
options that are open to the Zimbabwean government in terms of dedollarization and on the basis of 
the analysis thereof recommends the policy option to be pursued whilst four summarises and ties the 
arguments. 
 
2. Road to hyperinflation and dollarization 
2.1. 1997 to 1999: Political vulnerability and economic breakdown 
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The last half of 1997 marks a turning point from the relatively disciplined policies that the 
government had pursued since the attainment of independence in 1980.  A string of decisions largely 
to shore the government’s waning political support and appease powerful disgruntled groups through 
the transfer of economic resources in that period inexorably set in motion a rollercoaster of events 
that resulted in the economic collapse of the country.  These decisions had the effect of damaging 
confidence in the local currency, concomitantly exerting pressure on the Zimbabwean dollar in the 
currency markets, which fed to inflation via a pass-through from more expensive imported goods.   
Firstly, in August 1997, approximately 60,000 war veterans were granted ZWD50,000 each 
(approximately USD3,000 at the time) plus a monthly pension of approximately USD125 per month 
outside the budget (Chitiyo, 2000).1  The payouts amounted to almost three percent of GDP at the 
time and this had the immediate effect of inflating the budget deficit at the end of 1997 by 55 percent 
from the 1996 levels.  Concerns were raised pertaining to the financing side of the transaction in view 
of an already precarious fiscal position, and on that basis in September 1997, the World Bank 
temporarily withdrew a USD62.5 million standing credit line for the balance of payments support 
until the government had demonstrated that the payments would not result in a higher than the 
projected 8.9 percent budget deficit in the 18 months leading to December 1998.  As an ad hoc 
decision, the government had intended to accommodate the gratuities payment through tax increases 
in the 1998 budget but countrywide protests orchestrated by the trade unions forced the government 
to backpedal and resolve to monetization of the transaction (Amani Trust, 1998).  
Even though the World Bank announced that the withdrawal of balance of payments support 
was only a temporary measure, this act had the significance that it highlighted a growing chasm 
between the country’s leadership and the Bretton Woods financial institutions, as barely two months 
after the World Bank withdrawal, the IMF sent a delegation to the country to redraft the new lending 
programme to Zimbabwe which was set to have supported the second set of neo-liberal reforms amid 
the same concerns as those of the World Bank.   
The second populist decision followed in November 1997 when the president, Mugabe, 
announced plans to compulsorily acquire white-owned commercial farms, again without elaboration 
                                                 
1 Many grassroots ex-combatants who had not been financially compensated for their role in the liberation struggle were 
also victims of the twin scourges of poverty to ensuant to the neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
and the HIV/AIDS pandemic that was ravaging the country, hence they started agitating for the compensation that was 
due to them threatening the government hold on to power  (Chitiyo, 2000). 
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on the financing side of the transaction.2  This had the immediate effect of giving investors a 
perception of an ensuing precarious fiscal position and consequently there were spontaneous and 
concerted runs against the currency and from the money and capital markets.  The climax of these 
events was on 14 November 1997 when the Zimbabwean dollar crashed and lost 75 percent of its 
value against the USD on a single day, on what is now know as “Black Friday” in Zimbabwean 
economic history.  The stock market also plummeted and the index was down by 46 percent by day 
end from the peak August levels.  The central bank, had to intervene and raise interest rates by six 
percentage points within that single month (Bond, 1998).  Thenceforward the exchange rate 
continued to depreciate uncontrollably, thus the 1997 financial and currency turbulence set the stage 
for a long and potentially long slump in the real economy. 
The crash of the Zimbabwean dollar in the foreign exchange markets was immediately 
mirrored by its loss of value on the domestic markets, as in January 1998 there was an upsurge in 
consumer prices of 25 percent.  In response to the attendant fall in real wages, the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions organized protests which paralysed the whole country for two days, 
dangerously threatening the government’s grip on political power.  In an effort to assuage the masses, 
the government reintroduced price controls and simultaneously attempted to deflect negative public 
sentiment by shifting its rhetoric against industry, whom it blamed for excessive profiteering by 
charging exorbitant prices (ibid).  The immediate consequence of these price controls was 
widespread shortages of basic commodities in official markets and the genesis of the informalization 
of Zimbabwe’s economy, which was to eventually spread to financial markets due to government 
submarket controls on the forex rates.  Paradoxically, the government’s price controls, via the 
informal economy fuelled prices higher further eroding living standards and further alienating the 
masses.  These events highlight the government’s affinity to dirigisme as the philosophy of economic 
management, a theme which is recurrent in this doom-laden saga.  
The economic crisis the country endured as a consequence of the maladroit expenditure 
management persisted, and to add harm to injury, in September 1998 the president agreed to send 
11,000 troops under the SADC protocol, to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to back the 
discredited leader, Kabila, who was under attack by Rwandan and Ugandan backed rebels.  Dietrich 
(2000) contends that this act was simply the utilization of national military by the political elite for 
private financial gain as it emerged that the Zanu PF bigwigs had been promised mineral concession 
                                                 
2This was parcel of the 1993 Land Designation Act in which the government would compulsorily acquire 1,500 
white-owned farms with partial compensation covering buildings and infrastructure for redistribution to the landless black 
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in the DRC.   The precise costs of the ensuing war are open to speculation, as the government was 
tight-fisted with casualty and financial information pertaining thereto.  A letter written by the finance 
ministry to the IMF seeking funds puts the funds to finance the war at USD1.3 million per month in 
1998 or 0.4 percent of GDP and in 1999 when additional troops were deployed at USD3 million per 
month or at 0.6 percent of GDP (IMF, 1999).  Dorman (2001) however, postulates on the basis of a 
leaked memorandum form the ministry, the costs to have been at least ten times the official figures.  
The situation, be that as it was, the country could not spare forex outlays of such magnitude and this 
consequently weakened the currency, again with pernicious effect on price stability.  There was 
intense pressure on the currency and in a bid to increase the flows of foreign currency which were 
dwindling at precariously low levels, the central bank reintroduced widespread import controls and 
banned foreign currency accounts.  This dirigisme was futile as in the first quarter of 1999 the central 
bank, had to devalue the currency by 50 percent to trade at USD1: ZWD38 from USD1: ZWD25 
(Mumvuma et al, 2003). 
In the interim corruption continued to be endemic in both the public and private sector.  In 
one symbolic scandal, an indigenously owned bank, United Merchant Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd, which 
had been granted an operating license as part of the 1995 financial liberalization reforms, was 
declared insolvent in the backwash of the 1997-1998 interest rate hikes, after it had fraudulently 
issued ZWD1,263 million government-guaranteed promissory notes, sold them to other banks and 
deposited the money into personal offshore accounts of the bank’s owner, Boka.3  Due to the high 
extent of the exposure of other commercial bank to this bank, the whole bank system was in a crisis 
and the central bank had to intervene to bail out the affected banks with insidious effects on the fight 
against inflation (Fundira, 2003).  
The aforementioned events marked a period in which the inept handling of government 
expenditure instigated investors to lose confidence in the currency with the consequence that they ran 
away from it thereby putting a pressure on the exchange rate, which fuelled inflation through the 
increase in the prices of imports.  The pass through from depreciation to prices must have been very 
high.  Due to exchange rate depreciations Zimbabwe’s exports became cheaper abroad, however 
imports also became expensive and caused production costs to rise.  Thus a characterization of 
inflation in this first period is that it was of a cost-push nature.  This hypothesis is supported by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
majority.   
3 The issue of the Boka’s bank exposes how political considerations have played a role in Zimbabwe’s demise as there was 
reluctance on the part of the political establishment to have him charged and when he was eventually charged, he blamed 
government officials for not paying off the loans that he had given them. 
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findings of Odedokun (1997) who used pooled annual data of several Sub-Saharan African countries, 
including Zimbabwe, and found that currency depreciation in the official and parallel markets, 
monetary growth, and foreign inflation have had significant impacts on domestic inflation. 
 
2.2. 2000 to 2003: Land reform and destruction of the production base 
The president’s rhetoric on confiscation of white-owned farms was elevated to the next level 
in early 2000, when war veterans, who courtesy of the gratuities, were now the paramilitary wing of the 
ruling Zanu PF party, started invading white-owned farms as part of an elaborate scheme by Zanu PF 
to terrorise people to vote for it in the parliamentary election in July 2000 (Shaw, 2003).  Terror 
notwithstanding, the newly formed MDC party went on to secure almost half of the contested 
parliamentary seats.  In the aftermath of the plebiscite, the government delineated the parameters of 
its land redistribution policy embodied in the fast-track land reform programme under which 
300,000 households and 51,000 black commercial farmers would be apportioned the previously 
white-owned commercial farmers (Sachikonye, 2005).  
As a result of the upheavals on the farms, agricultural output was to fall dramatically from the 
level of  18 percent of GDP in 2000 to 14 percent of GDP in 2002 (World Bank, 2008).  Tobacco, 
the country’s major foreign currency earner was not spared as can be seen from figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: Tobacco output (millions USD): 1999 - 2004
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 According to figure 1 above, export proceeds from tobacco declined from USD612 million 
in 1999 to USD321 million in 2003.  The consequences of the falling agricultural output were as 
immediate as they were harmful.  The government could not service its multilateral debts obligations 
and as a result in October 2000, the World Bank suspended any extra lending to Zimbabwe under 
the IBRD and IDA facilities due to non-payment of over six months (World Bank, 2000).  This 
marked the closure of the country’s relations with the World Bank to date (2009) and paved way for, 
on a political front, the government’s isolationist stance and, on the economic front, free-fall of the 
unsupported currency.  On the other hand the government could not import essential raw materials 
and fuel as a result of the declining forex inflow, which further fed into falling production with the 
result that by 2004, total foreign currency earnings from the export of goods and services had 
declined to less than half the 1996 peak of USD3,169 million (World Bank, 2008).   
 March 2002 marked presidential elections in Zimbabwe, and taking full cognizance of the 
parliamentary elections results, the political violence was increased in the period leading to that date, 
as the Zanu PF militias pounced on supporters of the opposition MDC (Vollan, 2002).  In purported 
retaliation to the perceived deterioration of human rights conditions in the country, the European 
Union imposed sanctions against the country, after Mugabe had ejected a Swedish election observer 
before the 2002 elections.  Under the terms of the sanctions, The European Union suspended 
budgetary support to Zimbabwe and terminated ‘…financial support for all projects except those in 
direct support of the population…’  Additionally, a travel ban was imposed on 20 Zimbabwean 
government officials and their spouses, forbidding them travel within the European Union, and 
overseas assets held by the targeted officials were frozen (Slaughter, 2002).4  
There was no reprieve in terms of the isolation when Mugabe was announced re-elected in 
the aftermath of voting.  This isolation has economic relevance insofar as it has implications for 
bilateral aid that was coming into the country through donor agencies from Western governments.  
The consequence is that by the end of 2002 aid per capita had almost halved from the 1997 levels of 
USD28 per capita to USD16 per capita (World Bank, 2008).  To add harm to injury, the IMF 
suspended further technical assistance to the country in June 2002 over Zimbabwe's overdue 
                                                 
4 Earlier on The USA had passed the Zimbabwe Democracy Recovery Act 2001 whose 3A ‘…allows USA executive 
director to each international financial institution to oppose the vote against any extension by the respective financial 
institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe; or any cancellation or reduction of 
indebtedness owed by the government of Zimbabwe to the US or any international financial institution…’ (ZDERA, 
2001).   
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obligations totalling SDR101.9 million (about USD132 million) effectively severing the country’s 
relations with the West (IMF, 2002).   
Graham (2006) posits that having exhausted all the means to influence Mugabe’s government, 
the West turned to South Africa to use its considerable influence on Zimbabwe’s economy to 
influence Mugabe’s government, on the basis of the worsening humanitarian situation in the country.  
The Mbeki headed South African government was however, unperturbed by the inauspicious 
developments in its northern neighbour and would not be hastened to take bold steps towards 
resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis.  A hallmark of what became known as Mbeki’s ‘quiet 
diplomacy’.  
 With the country completely sequestered from the donor community, the crisis caused by 
forex shortages reached a climax in 2003.  An acute shortage of Zimbabwean dollar banknotes 
developed during the first nine months of 2003 and threatening public order in August as the central 
bank could not print local currency due to shortage of hard currency to import paper and ink.  There 
was a system-wide bank run like the one that epitomized the Argentinean crisis of 2002 as depositors 
tried frantically to access their funds.  Anti-riot police had to be dispatched to banks to quell rising 
tempers as clients were denied access to their savings.  Retrospectively, one could also conjecture that 
the crisis was not accidental but rather a simple monetary tightening by the central bank in the light of 
inflation that was running at over 199 percent.  In light of the cash crisis the central bank was 
immediately under fire and in the midst of mounting political pressure, the central bank chief was 
dislodged from his post three months prior to the expiration of his term (Mander, 2003).   
According to this analysis the major driver of inflation in this period was the shrinkage in 
aggregate supply sparked by the fall in the agriculture, which then spread to other sectors of the 
economy.  The shrinkage in aggregate supply would ceteris paribus, trigger price increases which 
ignite the price-wage spiral.  The exchange rate induced price increases as talked about in the 
previous period still reinforced inflation and they fed unto each other.   
 
2.3. 2004 to 2007: Pseudo-Keynesian economics  
On 1 December 2003 a new governor, Gono, was appointed to head the central bank.  The 
battle against inflation, which now stood at 263 percent on a year on year basis at the end of 2003, 
became Gono’s pons asinorum and in his maiden monetary policy statement for 2004, pronounced 
inflation as the country’s number one enemy.  He undertook money-targeting framework as the 
monetary policy strategy and consequently set up a ‘Framework for Liquidity Management’, which 
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was to contain money supply growth to levels consistent with inflation targets.  The interest rate was 
the operational target and it was raised acutely in the first quarter of 2004, reaching a peak of 5,242 
percent annually in March 2004.  Inflation which had soared from about 20 percent in December 
1997 to a peak of 623 percent in January 2004, decelerated sharply from March to around 130 
percent at the end of 2004 (RBZ, 2007).5   
Consequent to the high interest rates, financial institutions could not utilize the central bank 
accommodation window sparking a huge liquidity crisis in January 2004 which resulted in the 
collapse of Century Discount House on 3 January. Century Discount House was a subsidiary of 
ENG asset management companies.  Its collapse was triggered by the fact that it could not raise 
depositors’ funds totaling ZWD61 billion. The fall of Century Discount House triggered a contagion 
as too many financial institutions were exposed to ENG, thus triggering a liquidity crisis to mostly 
indigenously owned banks (Makoni, 2006).  In the light of this crisis, which threatened monetary 
stability, the central bank came to the rescue of the ailing institutions in the form of the Troubled 
Bank Fund (TBF).  The TBF was not a free lunch as onerous conditions were attached thereto, such 
as change of organizational structure in the affected banks, change in management and directors had 
to step down.  Moving on with the same issue, the high real interest rates and an increasingly 
overvalued official exchange rate was also putting pressure on domestic producers and exporters, and 
in a move sold as though it was to bail out the ailing industries, the central bank started engaging in 
quasi-fiscal activities.  The quasi-fiscal activities went beyond the operational realm of a normal 
central bank and had the effect of undoing the ephemeral achievements in the inflation battle and 
firmly set course for the drive towards hyperinflation.   
The shift to the quasi-fiscal policies disguised as Keynesian economics rhetoric was not only 
to resuscitate industry but sinisterly it was to nourish the unpopular ruling regime through populist 
disbursements of money, a classic example of Brantlinger’s (1985) ‘bread and circuses’ in despotic 
regimes.  Table 1 above reveals that at the height of these quasi-fiscal activities, money (M1) was 
increasing at the rate of 66,659 percent annually in 2007 and this feed to demand pull inflation during 
this period.  The hypothesis that the quasi-fiscal activities is the culprit in the increase in money 
                                                 
5Munoz (2007) points a paradox that the fall in inflation preceded the fall in money supply, which is contrary to 
conventional wisdom.  Though inflation was decreasing, broad money growth only started decelerating in July 2004 
from over 400 percent at the end of 2003 to 130 percent by the end of December 2004.  It implies therefore that prices 
during this period responded to other factors besides changes in monetary policy.  A hypothesis is that the fall in 
inflation was based on low inflation expectations owing to the aforementioned confidence that people had in the new 
governor, it was not the anticipation of tight monetary policy that triggered the fall in inflation. 
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supply, hence the major cause of inflation during the period after 2004, is supported by Munoz 
(2007) who observes that the major cause of the surge in money during the period 2004 – 2007, has 
been improvidence in the conduct of quasi-fiscal activities, rather than conventional fiscal laxity as in 
the period before 2000, as the average central government fiscal deficit for 2003–2005 was been 
below five percent of GDP.  
The notion that the quasi-fiscal activities were without inherent virtues save for political 
expediency is substantiated by the central bank’s selective distribution of food under the central bank 
BACCOSSI scheme or the farm mechanization programme, which were both largely targeted to 
areas were the ruling party still enjoyed some support.  The central bank crusades to shore the 
unpopular ruling regime at the expense of the masses went beyond inflation tax but also to diversion 
of donor funds passing through the central bank to the Zanu PF.  A case in point is the revelation that 
the central bank siphoned funds from the Global fund meant to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis in 2008 to aid Zanu PF’s political campaign (Muchemwa, 2009). 
In return to support rendered to Zanu PF, the government turned a blind eye to bureaucratic 
and personal interests at the central bank that were to the detriment of the country.  There was a high 
rate of organizational consumption at the central bank amounting to four percent of annual GDP for 
the ten months leading to October 2006 (Munoz, 2007).  At the time when general unemployment 
was running at over 80 percent in the country, the central bank was enlarging its staff at the expense of 
the whole nation with the result that by 1997 its staff doubled (Hanke, 2008).  
The ravaging inflation standing at over 1000 percent meant that the people had to carry large 
sums of currency to conduct the simplest of transaction and on 1 August 2006, the Zimbabwean 
dollar was replaced by a new Zimbabwean dollar exchanging at a ratio of 1000:1 and it was 
subsequently devalued against the USD.  A transition period of 21 days during which both currencies 
co-existed was given and thereafter the old notes ceased to be legal tender.  Implicit in this 
undertaking was an element of state-theft as stringent limits were given for the amounts convertible 
during that transition day period.  Border posts checks and roadblocks were mounted to curb the 
‘contraband’ movement of local currency.  According to the central bank governor, the instigator of 
the currency reforms dubbed ‘Project Sunrise’ was the rise of financial disintermediation 
characterized by 90 percent of the currency circulating outside the banking system.  A paragon of the 
naiveté and erroneous reasoning that pervades the governor’s reasoning is unveiled by his suggestion 
that striking off three zeros from the currency would suffice to cure inflation.  According to the central 
bank governor, the basis of these reforms was that the removal of three zeros would effectively have 
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‘ positive psychological effect on people's reference points when comparing the relative strength of 
the local currency against regional and international prices, as well as prices for goods and services…’ 
(RBZ, 2006).  In other words the governor conjectured that by simply removing zeros from the 
currency people would be confused to think that the Zimbabwean currency was no longer 
inflationary and hence revise their inflation expectations.  
Given the cosmetic nature of the reforms, there was no sign of recess in inflation and 
Zimbabwe formally entered hyperinflation according to Cagan’s (1956) definition in March 2007 
when month-on-month inflation reached 50.54 percent and year-on-year 2,200 percent (RBZ, 2007).  
This period thus, marked the country’s accelerated drive towards hyperinflation fuelled by the 
central bank’s quasi-fiscal activities meant to fund the political campaigns of an unpopular ruling 
regime.    In terms of economics, the characterization of inflation in this period is therefore of a 
demand pull nature consistent with the results of Coorey et al (2007) and Makochekanwa (2007) who 
found that the major driver of inflation was excess liquidity. 
 
2.4. 2008 to 2009: Dollarization and deflation 
2008 was to find hyperinflation gaining momentum, reaching 417,823 percent in March; and 
it is in that setting that Zimbabweans went to the harmonized presidential, legislature, and local 
government polls.  The elections were relatively peaceful and accordingly in line with the amount of 
discontent in the country the ruling Zanu PF party lost in all the three elections, for the first time 
losing its majority in the legislature.  The presidential ballot had to go for runoff between Mugabe 
who had 43.2 percent and Tsvangirai who had 47.9 percent as neither of them had the outright 
majority. 
The presidential poll run-off which was set for June never materialized as Tsvangirai 
withdrew citing the high level of violence against his supporters which was inimical to a free and fair 
poll.  In the aftermath of that withdrawal Mugabe then declared himself duly elected.  The combined 
effect of the hyperinflation and widespread collapse in social services rendered the country 
ungovernable without external support.  Mugabe had lost legitimacy internally and externally, hence 
could not access external funds to govern the country thus he was forced to enter into power-sharing 
negotiations with the opposition. 
In September 2008, after 3 months of negotiations overseen by the South African leader 
under the SADC protocol, Mugabe and Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing deal which would see 
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Mugabe assume the role of president whilst Tsvangirai that of the prime-minister.  However, haggling 
over the allocation of ministerial posts between the parties delayed the effectuation of the deal.  
By December 2008 the use of foreign currency as a medium of exchange was now almost 
complete albeit unofficially and in a move sold by the central bank as though to help businesses 
suffering from chronic shortages of foreign currency to import goods and spare parts, it licensed 
around 1,000 shops to sell goods in foreign currency.  This constituted the first conscious recognition 
of unofficial dollarization in Zimbabwe; however there was nothing altruistic about the central bank’s 
move as it was merely contrived for political expediency.  Upon recognition that the country had de 
facto dollarized, and that the government was still collecting taxes in the worthless local currency; the 
move was to support the ruling regime by increasing the foreign currency flowing into its coffers, 
through collections of hard currency taxes from the 1,000 shops but simultaneously criminalizing the 
use of foreign currency from the informal sector where it could not collect taxes.  This exposed to all 
and sundry that the government was self-serving; on one extreme it was still paying civil servants 
salaries in the worthless Zimbabwean currency, but at the same time somehow expected them access 
foreign currency to buy necessities in shops.   
In January 2009, a month after the licensing 1,000 shops the minister of finance gave legal 
tender status to the South African Rand and the US dollar, hence completing official dollarization.  
The role of local currency was relegated for use in small transactions and for change, which is the 
same role as that is played by local coins in other officially dollarized economies.  It is in this 
background that the opposition leader was sworn in as prime minister as per the power-sharing 
agreement of September 2008 after reaching a compromise on the allocation of ministerial posts. 
The institution of official dollarization underlined by the political accommodation had the 
obvious immediate effect of stopping hyperinflation and the country actually entered into deflation 
with consumer price inflation standing at -2.34 percent and -3.26 percent at the end of January and 
February respectively.  Aid from bilateral donors started trickling into the country and for the first 
time in over ten years the country forecasted positive growth (Ministry of Finance, 2009). 
 The country’s relations with the Bretton Woods financial institutions have yet to normalize 
though the IMF has approved targeted technical assistance in the areas of; tax policy and 
administration, payments systems, lender-of-last-resort operations and banking supervision, central 
banking governance and accounting to Zimbabwe in May 2009.  The basis of the resumption of 
cooperation was the observed substantial improvement in Zimbabwean government’s cooperation 
on economic policies to address its arrears problems (IMF, 2009).   On the other hand the World 
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Bank has not yet re-established any form of cooperation with Zimbabwe noting that conditions 
conducive to full fledged economic development programme with Zimbabwe have not yet been met 
(World Bank, 2009). 
 
3. The hypothetical roadmap to dedollarization. 
Galindo and Leiderman (2005) postulates that dedollarizing an economy is more often than 
not, the side effect, or endogenous consequence, of a tenacious process of disinflation and 
stabilization rather than the principal aim of a policy program.  As already noted in the foregoing, this 
section does not seek to make a case or lack thereof for dedollarization but rather seeks a 
hypothetical path to dedollarization.  
Following Erasmus et al (2009), there are three approaches, or a combination thereof, that 
Zimbabwe could adopt in the event that it does indeed, decides to dedollarize and reintroduce a 
national currency.  The first approach is market-based, that is the pursuance of macroeconomic 
policies that give the national currency stability on both the internal and external markets.  In other 
words, according to this approach, dedollarization is just a side effect of these policies of stabilization 
rather than a conscious objective of policy.  The mechanics of this approach is that the stability of the 
introduced local currency on both the domestic markets will make it attractive to Zimbabwean 
vis-à-vis foreign currency.   
The second alternative is non-market based approach in the form of regulatory reforms.  
These would aim to change the incentive structure of holding a portfolio of currencies in favor of the 
envisaged national currency.  These reforms could take several forms like setting differential reserve 
requirements or remuneration rates or adjusting provisioning and liquidity requirements. Other 
regulatory reforms entail the regulations requiring certain payments to or contracts to be conducted 
in the local currency.  
The third approach would be to employ another non-market means which is administrative 
enforcement.  Basically, this is simply to outlaw totally or limit by law, the use of foreign currency in 
the country or a variants of that such as prohibition of, or limits on, foreign currency deposits for 
residents and dollar loans, restrictions on residents holding accounts abroad, taxes on dollar 
intermediation, and forced conversion to local currency deposits (ibid).  One could also use a 
combination of the approaches in any proportion. 
Pursuance of market-based mechanism in Zimbabwe implies the introduction of local 
currency and the creation of conditions that enhance macroeconomic stability which will restore the 
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confidence of Zimbabweans in their own currency.  It is imperative to realize that dollarization 
usually persists long after the phenomenon that brought it in the first place has disappeared; hence it 
will be a slow path to dedollarization (ibid).  It will however be the surest way towards dedollarization 
because it is voluntary and the one that is consistent with freedom as no direct or indirect coercive 
force will be induced upon Zimbabweans to facilitate dedollarization.      
This process therefore hinges critically on the credibility of the reform process.  Ndlela 
(2008) gives several constituent elements of the reform process in Zimbabwe, among which; a 
political settlement that is consistent with the aspirations of the majority Zimbabweans, a 
commitment to globally acceptable values of political governance such as the protection of human 
rights, commitment to rule of law and the final element is institutional reforms among which, ensures 
independence of the judiciary and the central bank. 
Regulatory reforms as an approach to dedollarization in Zimbabwe would shift the 
currency-holding incentives towards the local currency.  These measures make it more profitable for 
the agent to hold Zimbabwean currency rather than foreign currency.  As this approach does not   
emphasize on macroeconomic stability or qualities of the local currency itself, there is a danger that 
this factor combined with the differential returns on foreign currency and local currency might 
encourage a culture of speculation and rent-seeking behavior which will ultimately be to the 
detriment of genuine investment.  Further to this there is need to consider the fiscal implications of 
these incentives which do not auger well for monetary and fiscal authorities with a history fiscal 
profligacy.  A case in point is say where the government pays above market returns on bonds in local 
currency which implies an indirect extra cost to the government.  
As in the case of a market approach, for this approach to work in Zimbabwe, there should be 
institutional reforms at the central bank, to make it more independent thus cushion it from being 
coerced to monetize government deficits, and secondly more transparent hence cease engaging in 
quasi-fiscal activities, all of which are injurious to the goal of price stability.  
  The final option is administrative enforcement.  It is noteworthy, at a certain level of 
perception, that this is the system that existed in Zimbabwe prior to official dollarization, as the 
holding of foreign currency was outlawed.  Experience has shown that it would only result in 
unofficial dollarization (and the attendant black market for currency and corruption as people will 
always find illegal ways to hold foreign currency) if the local currency is found to be unstable by the 
people. Attendant to unofficial dollarization, are other ills that are deleterious to the economy, that 
would arise such as financial disintermediation and capital flight.  The combined effect of these things 
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would be to sharply reduce domestic credit and consequently investment (Priewe and Herr, 2003).  
All these phenomena as noted before already manifested in Zimbabwe as a result of dirigisme.  
Another shortcoming is that this will hit hard the poorest in the event that the envisaged currency is of 
a poor quality as the elite will find ways, illegal or otherwise to take their monies out of the country 
thus preserving their wealth. 
 Thus given, on the basis of the perceived realizations in the event of the institutions of either 
of these three paths, dedollarization in Zimbabwe should be endogenous outcome of a process of 
macroeconomic stabilization.  The recommendation is therefore for a market based approach, the 
slowness of the process notwithstanding, it is the surest path towards dedollarization and the one that 
is most consistent with freedom.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The issues at the core of Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation predate the fast-track land reform 
programme.  The first impetus to the cataclysm lie in the string of policies aimed at pacifying certain 
disgruntled social groups through the transfer of economic resources in order to retain political 
power.  The combined effects of these measures were to give a perception of fiscal instability to 
investors which led to currency depreciation hence inflation. 
The fast-track land reform programme played a major role in the destruction of the country’s 
production base hence contributing to inflation.  In the latter part of the Zimbabwe’s case, the 
quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank were responsible for the growth in money supply which fed to 
inflation.  The quasi-fiscal activities were construed for political expediency to prop the hugely 
unpopular ruling Zanu PF party. 
The whole Zimbabwean saga is littered with dirigisme meant for self preservation of the 
ruling Zanu PF party.  These controls are found in the form of restrictions in the holding of foreign 
currency and also in the form of price controls. 
The decision in the final phase to adopt official dollarization was a mere recognition of the de 
facto unofficial dollarization.  The institution of official dollarization combined with the 
implementation of the power-sharing deal in Zimbabwe immediately brought down inflation. 
Though the pursuance of market reforms to dedollarization will be slow, it is the surest and 
the one that is most likely to succeed.  These will hinge on the credibility of the whole reform process. 
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